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- Government and Politics in Africa
- The politics of race and nation: Citizenship and Africanization in Tanganyika
- Government and Politics in Africa
- Government and Politics in Africa
Abbott, Elizabeth. New York: McGraw-Hill. Baloyra, Enrique A.
After experiencing decades of a tripartite colonial racial order that denied Africans political and civic rights, the newly independent nation of Tanganyika defined the rights and obligations of citizenship in terms of territory rather than race, rejecting rapid Africanization and exclusionary policies toward its minority Asian population. This rejection of racial nationality as a fundamental social category was an outcome of conflicts among nationalist elites over whether to use civic exclusion of the Asian minority to foster national unity among the black majority. Nationalist leaders imagined different communities of the nation. Some advocated inclusive citizenship and a nationalist vision based on color-blind policies while others appealed to popular racial animosities rooted in the inherited tripartite racial order and contended that race-blind policies would reinforce the dominance of an already privileged racial minority. Which of these visions triumphed and became institutionalized was a result of conflicts within and between nascent political parties.
Government and Politics in Africa
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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Issues discussed in the book include the state in relation to the market economy; women, AIDS and the policies of multinational pharmaceutical companies; the politics of patronage and corruption; international aid and the slow provision of debt relief. Increased coverage is given to North and South Africa, and key issues such as elections and land in Zimbabwe and genocide in Rwanda are fully ventilated.
As before, the help and advice which I have received from Ralph A. Young of the Department of Government, University of Manchester, has been invaluable and is greatly appreciated. I am grateful to my publisher Steven Kennedy, and to Cecily Wilson, Keith Povey and Barbara Docherty for their guidance in preparing this edition for publication, and especially to my wife Audrey for her constant support.
Changes of name usually occurred at independence; post-independence changes are indicated in brackets. Ruanda-Urundi was a Belgian-administered UN trust territory which became independent in as two separate states, Rwanda and Burundi. Southern Cameroons, a British-administered UN trust territory, joined the Republic of Cameroon following a plebiscite in ; the people of Northern Cameroons opted for integration with Nigeria. In the Ivorian government instructed international organisations to use the French language designation in all official documents.
Often referred to as French Somaliland. Eritrea was subject in turn to Italian colonial rule, British military administration, and Ethiopian control. In the two states formed the confederation of Senegambia; this was dissolved in The Mali Federation was formed by Senegal and Soudan inbut survived for less than three months after being granted political independence by France in June France then recognised the separate independence of Senegal and Soudan, and the Union Soudanaise changed the name of Soudan to the Republic of Mali.
Also known as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Its international status is still in dispute. The northern region of Somalia declared itself independent as the Republic of Somaliland in ; the United Nations has not yet granted recognition.
No change in name, but a change in substance of immense importance occurred when non-racial multi-party elections in April resulted in the establishment of black majority rule. Madeira Port Canary Is. There is, for example, a wide cultural gap between the North African states and the Black African states south of the Sahara.
The geographic and demographic differences are often striking, as witnessed by the huge Sudan and Zaire on the one hand and the tiny Rwanda, Burundi and Swaziland on the other; within West Africa, oil-rich Nigeria — four times the size of Britain and with a population in of some million — contrasts sharply with the Gambia which, with an area of just over 10, square kilometres and a population of approximately 1.
There is also an immense divide between stable and prosperous Botswana and states — including Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo DRCSierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan — which are torn apart by civil war and with the partial exception of mineral-rich Angola face economic collapse.
None the less, at independence these new African states had several things in common. First they were ex-colonial: that is, with only a few exceptions such as Liberia they had been subjected to rule by one or another of the colonial powers: Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and South Africa in respect of Namibia.
South Africa excl. GDP is calculated from national data and facilitates cross-country comparisons and the analysis of trends for individual countries. GNP, which is used by the United Nations for comparative purposes, comprises GDP adjusted for changes in international terms of trade and is subject to exchange rate fluctuations. The figures for GDP are expressed at prices. Secondary school enrollment is the ratio of children of all ages enrolled in secondary schools to the population of children of secondary school age.
In respect of both primary and secondary schooling, the definition of school age differs between countries, but is most commonly considered to be 6 to 11 years for primary, and 12 to 17 years for secondary education. Sources: African Development Indicators, Introduction 5 rule was brief often less than a hundred years and these new states were also old societies, with a pre-colonial history of their own. Second, they were searching for a new identity as nation-states.
At independence, they acquired statehood and, as members of the UN, international recognition, but with very few exceptions such as Botswana the task remained of welding into a nation a variety of different peoples, speaking different languages and at different stages of social and political development.
Third, these states were mostly poor, predominantly rural and over-dependent on the vagaries of the world market. Any benefits which they received from foreign aid, for example, might be swiftly eroded if the terms of trade turned against them through a fall in the price which they received for their primary produce. The leaders of many of these states, therefore, sought to diversify the economy away from reliance on a single cash crop or mineral product for example, Ghana on cocoa, Senegal and the Gambia on groundnuts, and Zambia on copper.
However, in trying to industrialise they faced immense problems: of technology and manpower, of the cost of imported machinery, and marketing. Moreover, in the West industrialisation took place before full democratic practices were introduced into the political process, and this meant that resources were available to meet the most pressing demands of the workers as they became enfranchised.
In the fourth place, the newly independent states had an unsettled political culture. Not only had the political leadership next to no experience of operating a governmental system on a national scale, but the institutions such as parties, parliaments and civil services through which they had to work were also relatively new and weak. The weakness of the inherited institutions was serious because the private sector was underdeveloped and the state itself had to assume a major entrepreneurial role.
The result was an increase in the number of public enterprises and in bureaucratic power, and a further widening of the elite—mass gap, with educated, mostly urbanised elites existing side by side with conservative and often illiterate chiefs and villagers. Finally, in the international context, the new 6 Government and Politics in Africa states were no match, either diplomatically or militarily, for the developed states; in the s especially, most francophone states took shelter under the wing of the former metropolitan power.
It was only in the next decade that the oil weapon gave a few states a significant economic, and therefore diplomatic, leverage. And so one could go on, adding to the list of common characteristics of the new African states and pointing to shared problems.
Of course, these common characteristics masked important differences. In relation to the industrialised Western countries, the new African states were indeed poor; but, as between themselves, some were much better off than others the Ivory Coast was better off than neighbouring Upper Volta, for example.
There were differences between the states in manpower terms: in this respect, West Africa was much better off than East Africa; educationally, there was almost a generation gap between them.
Mainland Tanzania, like Zambia, faced independence with barely a hundred graduates and a totally inadequate number of secondary-school leavers; but both states were better off than Angola and Mozambique, though less so than Zimbabwe. Moreover, as I have suggested, some of the differences arising from the colonial legacy were reproduced in the external sphere, with ex-French colonies tending to maintain closer ties with France than ex-British colonies did with Britain.
It might be objected that what have been depicted as characteristics of the new states at independence were not peculiar to those states, but were shared by some of the developed states also.
The main difference lay in degree — the greater severity of these problems in the new states — and especially in the concentration of these problems. If it is accepted that such Introduction 7 features were common characteristics subject to the caveat that they masked important underlying differenceswe must ask next: what has happened since independence? Since we are faced with so much that is new in African politics, I identify a number of trends, concentrating first on the twenty-odd years following independence.
An obvious trend, in most of Africa in the s, was the move away from pluralism towards the centralisation of power in the hands of a single party. By the early s few countries retained multi-party systems and, with the odd exception such as Botswana and the Gambiawe had — as political scientists — to talk in terms of competition within the single-party system rather than of competition between parties.
It should, of course, be noted that this trend was reversed from the mids with the restoration, following military withdrawal, of multi-party politics in Ghana and Nigeria in and, to a more limited extent, with new constitutional and political experiments in the francophone states of Senegal and Upper Volta later Burkina Faso. From the late s the popular demand for an end to one-party rule and the institution of competitive multi-party politics became well-nigh universal; I return to this issue below.
A second and related trend was not only for power to be centralised in a single party, but also for it be personalised in the hands of the party leader, who became state president. It can be argued that Nyerere retained his appeal after independence because he realised that charisma must be socially validated; in practical terms, this meant that he was able to assess the changing social situation and adapt himself and his policies to it.
Authoritarianism, coupled with lack of accountability and transparency, and with corruption and political manipulation, were marked characteristics of African one-party regimes in the post-independence period. They were features of the patronage politics which everywhere prevailed and which a perceptive leader, such as Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, could check but not control. The weakness of the private sector meant that state economic management was dominant and provided state personnel with the opportunity to abuse their office, enrich themselves and benefit their supporters.
In the s, the range among African states in this regard was very wide, thereby underlining the fact that socialism was a loose concept in Africa and subject to varying interpretations. They rejected key tenets of Marxist orthodoxy, such as the notion of the class struggle, and adapted Marxist and other ideas to suit African conditions. Some states, including many of those under military rule, either shunned ideology or rested on a weak ideological base. It is as well to remember, however, that such measures were taken by states, such as military-ruled Ghana and Uganda, which did not claim to be socialist as well as by states such as Tanzania, whose rulers did pursue broadly socialist strategies.
Further changes took place in the s, though their effect was not everywhere to reverse the earlier trend towards an eclectic brand of African socialism. These resulted from the emergence in several states of a more orthodox form of Marxist socialism than had previously existed, except perhaps in Guinea in the late s. These regimes shared a commitment to Marxist—Leninist principles, but differed in the way in which they set about the task of socialist transformation.
A fourth post-independence trend, which was observable in many states before the rash of military coups, was the progressive decline of the party as the centre of power and decision-making and the corresponding rise of the bureaucracy. Writing inhe pointed to the emergence of the administrative state, with the party reduced to a symbolic role.
In Guinea the party was not eclipsed by the state structure, but existed in parallel to it, subsuming it at the lower levels. This happened in Kenya, where the party organs tended to atrophy through lack of use.
It happened to some extent, too, though not intentionally, in Tanzania and Zambia. In Zambia, also, the bureaucracy rather than the ruling party increasingly spearheaded the development effort in the Second Republic. In Senegal, too, the PS was effective as an agent of control and patronage, but it was not a machine designed for mass mobilisation.
Why did the military intervene? Why did it intervene in some states, but not in others? As I show in Chapter 7, sometimes the military, as the custodian of the national interest, intervened to save the country from corrupt and inefficient politicians; in others, it intervened to safeguard its own interest against a rival force being created by the President; and in others again it had political objectives.
A common feature of the coups was the ease with which they were executed, often by only a small force of men. Most did not involve any fundamental restructuring of society, though this pattern was sometimes broken where revolutionary military regimes were established, as in Ethiopia and Somalia. On assuming power, the military sometimes promised that it would yield to a civilian government and withdraw to the barracks once constitutional integrity had been restored, corruption eliminated, and the economy revived.
The military did in fact withdraw in a number of cases, including Ghana in and and Nigeria in ; sometimes, however, the military withdrew only to return, often within a short period of time, as in Dahomey now Benin on several occasions, Sudan inGhana in andand Nigeria in From the mids, the nature of military coups Introduction 11 seemed to alter, with the soldiers coming to stay for long periods.
The tendency in francophone Africa was for the incumbent military regime to seek to legitimatise its rule by forming a political party and then holding presidential and parliamentary elections. Despite their civilian garb, these remained essentially military regimes. Another post-independence trend in African politics was the move away from federal and quasi-federal systems of government to unitary structures; Nigeria, under civilian rule, and the Sudan afterwere the only important exceptions to this pattern.
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The politics of race and nation: Citizenship and Africanization in Tanganyika
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Preferred Citation: Widner, Jennifer A. Today's political science too often inculcates a dispassionate view of politics among scholars. Somewhere in the "literature reviews," mathematical models, "event counts," and language of "transaction costs" are buried issues and incidents that have real impacts on people's lives. The research that led to this book offered the kind of political education graduate schools and secluded research centers do not provide. In the s, restrictions on speech and association in Kenya chilled discussion of policy and institutional development. During the period in which the research was carried out, Kenyan civil servants became noticeably less willing to take decisions, for fear of disapproval, and government business in some ministries slowed markedly.
Praise for previous editions..". a wonderfully comprehensive yet succinct textbook on African politics." --Third World Quarterly "[W]ritten with an economy of.
Government and Politics in Africa
Government and politics in Tanzania;:. Party politics in Kenya, - Janda. Each of the ten chapters in his book is written with an economy of language and a breadth of knowledge rarely found in political science writings. He studied at the University of Oxford.
Government and Politics in Africa
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[William_Tordoff]_Government_and_Politics_in_Afric(opportunitymeridian.org).pdf - Free ebook in Africa Fourth Edition. William Tordoff GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA embraced earlier by Cardoso and others writing on Latin America.
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